## Knowledge Context of Entrepreneurship, New Entrants' Capabilities, and Performance Outcomes

Aliasghar Bahoo-Torodi (Bocconi University) Roberto Fontana (University of Pavia & Bocconi University) Franco Malerba (Bocconi University)



## MOTIVATION

Evolutionary economics tells us that historical antecedents in the form of pre-entry resources and capabilities shape new entrants' outcomes (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002)

Across different streams of entrepreneurship and strategy literature, significant scholarly attention has been paid to the role of "*knowledge context*", where individuals identify their entrepreneurial ideas or accumulate resources as the basis for new venture formation (Agarwal & Shah, 2014)

Although in isolate and independent from each other, only a few recent studies have examined the factors underlying the performance heterogeneity across ventures originating from universities and incumbent firms (e.g., Clarysse et al., 2011; Wennberg et al., 2011; Zahra et al., 2007)



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## MOTIVATION

Prior research has generally overlooked heterogeneity within the corporate spinoffs category as some spawns may receive support and benefit from oversight and ownership by the parent organizations (i.e., parent spinoffs), while others are independent ventures that spin out from different types of incumbent firms (i.e., employee spinouts)

Prior works on employee spinouts have largely focused on firm formation by ex-employees of incumbents in the focal industry and overlooked spinouts from the upstream (supplier) or downstream (user) industries.

Lack of a systematic comparison between firms originating from different knowledge contexts with respect to their capabilities and long-run performance



### **RESEARCH QUESTION**

#### How the knowledge context of entrepreneurship shapes a) formation, b) target technological fields, c) type of capabilities and resources, and d) long-run performance of new ventures originating from them?



### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **Data Sources:**

i- Population of US startups listed on *Crunchbase* operating in the artificial intelligence industry

ii- Resort to companies' website and two business directories (*Bloomberg & RelSci*) to complement and verify data related to startups' founding members

iii- Rigorous search using *LinkedIn & Crunchbase* to collect data on the career history of all founders

iv- Control for presence of any formal relationships between the spawning and the spawned ventures



#### **Final Sample:**

1300 ventures entered the artificial intelligence industry in the US over the period 2000-2014



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## **EMPIRICAL STRATEGY**

Origin

Entry Time (Early vs Late stage)

Technological Field (Learning systems, Robotics, Symbolic)

Capabilities (Granted patents, Registered trademarks, Funding)

Performance Outcome (Survival and Failure)

- STAGE ONE Spawn (i.e., academic spinoffs, employee spinouts, and parent spinoffs) vs Non-spawn Startups (i.e., denovo entrants by founders with no pre-entry employment).
- STAGE TWO Employee Spinouts (i.e., spinouts from upstream supplier, focal, and downstream user industries) vs Nonspawn Startups



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### **1- WHO ARE THE ENTRANTS?**



Non-	Academic	Parent	Supplier	Focal	User	Other
Spawns	S Spinoffs	Spinoffs	Spinouts	Spinouts	Spinouts	Spinouts
167	261	135	254	114	314	55



### **2-WHEN DO THEY ENTER THE INDUSTRY?**



• 26.6% of non-spawn ventures entered the industry during the early stages, while 73.4% entered during the later stages of the industry growth. Also, 27.8% of academic spinoffs entered the industry during the early stages, while other 72.8% entered during the later stages.

29.1% of employee spinouts entered the industry during the early stages, while other 70.9% entered during the later stages of the industry growth. Finally, 27.4% of parent spinoffs entered the industry during the early stages, while other 72.6% entered during the later stages of the industry growth.



### 2- WHEN DO THEY ENTER THE INDUSTRY?



- 30.8% of supplier spinouts entered the industry during the early stages, while 69.2% entered during the later stages of the industry growth. Also, 23.5% of focal spinouts entered the industry during the early stages, while other 76.5% entered during the later stages. Finally, 29.2% of user spinouts entered the industry during the early during the early stages, while 70.8% entered during the later stages.
- Taken together these results, employee spinouts from the focal industry have lower rates of entry during the early stages of the industry growth compared to the supplier and user spinouts.



### **3-WHICH TECHNOLOGICAL FIELDS DO THEY ENTER?**

(Keyword Allocation adopted from Cockburn et al., 2018)												
Symbols	Learning	Robotics										
Natural language processing	Machine learning	Computer vision										
Image grammars	Neural networks	Robot										
Pattern recognition	Reinforcement learning	Robots										
Image matching	Logic theorist	Robot systems										
Symbolic reasoning	Bayesian belief networks	Robotics										
Symbolic error analysis	Unsupervised learning	Robotic										
Pattern analysis	Deep learning	Collaborative Systems										
Symbol processing	Knowledge representation and reasoning	Humanoid robotics										
Physical processing	Crowdsourcing and human computation	Sensor networks										
Physical symbol system	Neuromorphic computing	Sensor data fusion										
Natural languages	Decision making	Systems and control theory										
Image alignment	Machine intelligence	layered control systems										
Optimal search	Neural network											

## **Artificial Intelligence Application Fields**

**Symbolic systems:** firms that attempt to replicate the logical flow of human decision making through processing symbols

Learning: processing data through analytical programs modelled on neurologic systems. It attempts to create methods for the prediction of particular events in the presence of particular inputs.

**Robotics:** the field includes deployment of "machines" and robots in manufacturing and automation applications.

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### **3- WHICH TECHNOLOGICAL FIELDS DO THEY ENTER?**





- 69.9% of non-spawn ventures operate in the 'learning systems' sector, 20.2% in 'robotics', and 9.8% are active in 'symbolic systems' field. Also, 67.3% of academic spinoffs operate in the 'learning systems' sector, 17.3% in 'robotics', and 15.4% are active in 'symbolic systems' field.
- 79% of employee spinouts operate in the 'learning systems' sector, 12% in 'robotics', and 9% are active in 'symbolic systems' field. Finally, 67.8% of parent spinoffs operate in the 'learning systems' sector, 17.8% in 'robotics', and 14.4% are active in 'symbolic systems' field.
- Taken together previous findings, employee spinouts account for the largest share of entrants in the 'learning systems' sector, while compared to the other types of entrants, academic and parent spinoffs have a higher share in the 'symbolic systems' and 'robotics' field, respectively.

### **3-WHICH TECHNOLOGICAL FIELDS DO THEY ENTER?**





- 75.4% of supplier spinouts operate in the 'learning systems' sector, 13.5% in 'robotics', and 11.1% are active in 'symbolic systems' field. Also, 69.7% of focal spinouts operate in the 'learning systems' sector, 20.2% in 'robotics', and 10.1% are active in 'symbolic systems' field. Finally, 84.5% of user spinouts operate in the 'learning systems' sector, 8.4% in 'robotics', and 7.1% are active in 'symbolic systems' field.
- Taken together, the share of spinouts from the downstream user industries is larger in the 'learning systems' sector. In contrast, spinouts from the upstream supplier industries account for a larger share of entrants in the 'symbolic systems' and 'robotics' fields.

### **4-HOW DO THEY DIFFER WITH RESPECT TO CAPABILITIES?**

STAGE ONE – Negative Binomial Regressions for the Entrants' Capabilities														
		(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			
VARIABLES	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding		
Startups	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.		
Academic Spinoffs	0.405	-0.0639	0.420	0.405	-0.0640	0.430	0.264	-0.0987	0.480	0.264	-0.0985	0.483		
Spin-outs	1.147***	0.0798	0.945***	1.147***	0.0798	0.954***	1.010***	0.106	0.953***	1.010***	0.106	0.956***		
Parent Spinoff	(0.341) 1.291*** (0.448)	0.712** (0.279)	(0.554) 0.903* (0.488)	(0.341) 1.288*** (0.448)	(0.212) 0.712** (0.279)	(0.354) 0.919* (0.487)	(0.555) 0.970* (0.511)	(0.211) 0.655** (0.289)	(0.565) 0.913* (0.501)	(0.353) 0.969* (0.511)	0.655** (0.289)	(0.365) 0.917* (0.501)		
	2.4(*	0.27	2.05	2.4(*	0.27	2.04	2.00*	0.72	(0.501)	2.00*	0.72	(0.001)		
Test of coefficient equality: Academic Spinoff = Spin-out Test of coefficient equality: Parent Spinoff = Spin-out	0.15	8.31***	0.01	0.15	8.30***	0.01	0.01	5.55**	0.01	0.01	5.55**	0.01		
N. Founders	0.275**	0.245***	0.406***	0.275**	0.245***	0.406***	0.267*	0.219***	0.410***	0.267*	0.219***	0.410***		
N. Founders Same Parent	(0.127) 1.842***	(0.0783) 0.617***	(0.140) 0.484**	(0.127) 1.845***	(0.0783) 0.617***	(0.140) 0.485**	(0.138) 1.791***	(0.0793) 0.635***	(0.144) 0.486**	(0.138) 1.794***	(0.0794) 0.635***	(0.144) 0.485**		
Founder Tenure	(0.193) 0.0207	(0.120) 0.0225	(0.235) -0.0121	(0.193) 0.0207	(0.121) 0.0225	(0.235) -0.0116	(0.210) 0.0298	(0.123) 0.0231	(0.240) -0.00971	(0.210) 0.0297	(0.123) 0.0231	(0.240) -0.00955		
Founder Position Parent (Executive=1; Other=0)	-0.277	0.219	0.0252)	-0.276	0.219	0.0252)	-0.218	0.184	0.0254)	-0.217	0.184	0.0254)		
Serial Entrepreneur	0.670***	0.165)	0.0574	(0.251) 0.670***	(0.165) 0.107	0.278)	(0.281) 0.689**	0.169)	(0.296) 0.0160	(0.281) 0.689**	0.169)	0.0139		
Founder Position Firm (Executive=1; Other=0)	(0.258) 1.212***	(0.150) 0.755***	(0.254) 0.526	(0.258) 1.213***	(0.150) 0.755***	(0.254) 0.536	(0.268) 1.254***	(0.152) 0.746***	(0.263) 0.609	(0.268) 1.254***	(0.152) 0.746***	(0.263) 0.611		
Founder Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	(0.368) 0.901**	(0.220) 0.564**	(0.377) 0.629	(0.368) 0.902**	(0.220) 0.564**	(0.377) 0.626	(0.386) 0.630	(0.221) 0.519**	(0.394) 0.626	(0.386) 0.630	(0.221) 0.520**	(0.394) 0.626		
Founder Education (PhD=1; Other=0)	(0.390) 0.685***	(0.248) 0.0235	(0.412) 0.530*	(0.391) 0.683***	(0.248) 0.0233	(0.412) 0.526*	(0.413) 0.712**	(0.250) 0.00409	(0.421) 0.461	(0.413) 0.711**	(0.250) 0.00402	(0.421) 0.460		
Collaboration	(0.259) 0.122	(0.160) 0.252	(0.278) 0.472	(0.259) 0.122	(0.160) 0.252	(0.278) 0.473	(0.279) 0.148	(0.165) 0.342	(0.287) 0.393	(0.279) 0.147	(0.165) 0.342	(0.287) 0.394		
Firm Age	(0.399) 0.103***	(0.241) 0.0365*	(0.372) 0.128***	(0.399)	(0.241)	(0.372)	(0.459) 0.138	(0.246) 0.00194	(0.409) 0.105	(0.459)	(0.246)	(0.409)		
IMR	(0.0362)	(0.0203)	(0.0351)	-5.311***	-4.755*	3.526***	(0.107)	(0.0540)	(0.0696)	-7.128	-0.339	2.877		
Founding Year Fixed Effect	NO 2 550***	NO 1 540***	NO 2 702***	NO 2 550***	NO 1 540***	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Constant	(0.0651)	(0.0615)	(0.0380)	(0.0651)	(0.0615)	(0.0380)	(0.0656)	(0.0620)	(0.0380)	(0.0656)	(0.0620)	(0.0380)		
Constant	(0.765)	(0.444)	(0.737)	(2.409)	(2.746)	(0.970)	(2.379)	(1.255)	(1.735)	(6.043)	(6.725)	(2.563)		
Observations	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300		
Log likelihood LR chi2	-1765.7595 250.50***	-1949.5488 109.59***	-15101.049 61.25***	-1765.771 250.48***	-1949.546 109.60***	-15101.182 60.99***	-1756.125 269.89***	-1941.208 126.77***	-15098.1 67.15***	-1756.111 269.80***	-1941.208 126.27***	-15098.201 66.95***		

Note: Inverse Mill's Ratio was created using the residuals from the first stage selection model, where we estimated the likelihood of receiving patent, trademark and financing by means of a probit regression using firm' age. Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

- Both employee spinouts and parent spinoffs create more knowledge (in term of granted patents) and raise a higher amount of capital compared to the academic spinoffs and non-spawn startups.
- Parent spinoffs also possess better market capabilities (in term of registered trademarks) than other types of entrants.



### 4- HOW DO THEY DIFFER WITH RESPECT TO CAPABILITIES?

-		(1)		8.1.1	(2)	1	1	(3)			(4)	
VARIABLES	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding
Startups	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Supplier Spin-outs	0.817**	-0.255	0.889**	0.817**	-0.255	0.899**	0.670*	-0.261	0.783*	0.671*	-0.261	0.785*
Focal Spin-outs	1.195***	0.480*	1.229**	1.195***	0.479*	1.238**	1.126**	0.499*	1.258**	1.125**	0.499*	1.261**
User Spin-outs	(0.451) 1.340*** (0.358)	0.198 (0.228)	(0.545) 1.054** (0.410)	(0.451) 1.340*** (0.358)	(0.285) 0.198 (0.228)	(0.545) 1.060*** (0.410)	(0.438) 1.451*** (0.362)	(0.280) 0.259 (0.229)	(0.557) 1.083** (0.423)	(0.438) 1.451*** (0.362)	0.259 (0.229)	(0.557) 1.084** (0.423)
Test of coefficient equality: Supplier Spin-out = Focal Spin-out	0.70	7.46***	0.46	0.70	7.46***	0.46	1.07	7.82***	0.82	1.06	7.81***	0.82
Test of coefficient equality: User Spin-out = Focal Spin-out	0.12	1.23	0.14	0.12	1.23	0.13	0.62	0.90	0.13	0.62	0.90	0.13
N. Founders	0.244**	0.182**	0.376**	0.244**	0.182**	0.376**	0.314**	0.167**	0.385**	0.315**	0.167**	0.385**
	(0.124)	(0.0812)	(0.165)	(0.124)	(0.0812)	(0.165)	(0.135)	(0.0832)	(0.174)	(0.135)	(0.0832)	(0.174)
N. Founders Same Parent	0.0942	0.146	0.450	0.0940	0.146	0.450	0.0713	0.142	0.460	0.0716	0.142	0.459
	(0.249)	(0.157)	(0.321)	(0.249)	(0.157)	(0.321)	(0.277)	(0.164)	(0.346)	(0.277)	(0.164)	(0.346)
Founder Tenure	0.0333	0.0528***	-0.000698	0.0333	0.0528***	-0.000676	0.0506	0.0546***	-6.45e-05	0.0505	0.0546***	6.90e-05
	(0.0338)	(0.0192)	(0.0387)	(0.0338)	(0.0192)	(0.0387)	(0.0355)	(0.0196)	(0.0386)	(0.0355)	(0.0196)	(0.0386)
Founder Position Parent (Executive=1; Other=0)	-0.519*	0.0863	-0.0381	-0.520*	0.0864	-0.0386	-0.332	0.104	0.0308	-0.331	0.105	0.0300
	(0.302)	(0.186)	(0.358)	(0.302)	(0.186)	(0.358)	(0.304)	(0.191)	(0.362)	(0.304)	(0.191)	(0.363)
Serial Entrepreneur	0.107	-0.0414	-0.00329	0.108	-0.0414	-0.00433	0.111	-0.0662	-0.0543	0.112	-0.0661	-0.0576
	(0.267)	(0.169)	(0.316)	(0.267)	(0.169)	(0.315)	(0.270)	(0.171)	(0.329)	(0.270)	(0.171)	(0.329)
Founder Position Firm (Executive=1; Other=0)	1.350***	0.759***	0.814	1.350***	0.759***	0.817	1.352***	0.811***	0.830	1.351***	0.811***	0.830
	(0.458)	(0.277)	(0.520)	(0.458)	(0.277)	(0.520)	(0.470)	(0.280)	(0.532)	(0.470)	(0.280)	(0.532)
Founder Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	0.918*	0.388	0.554	0.918*	0.388	0.557	0.900*	0.366	0.607	0.900*	0.366	0.610
Foundary Education (PhD=1, Other=0)	(0.470)	(0.310)	(0.572)	(0.470)	(0.310)	(0.572)	(0.505)	(0.322)	(0.588)	(0.505)	(0.322)	(0.588)
Founder Education (FilD-1; Outer-0)	(0.208)	(0.100)	(0.281)	(0.208)	(0.100)	(0.281)	(0.218)	(0.200)	(0.205)	(0.218)	(0.200)	(0.205)
Collaboration	0.308)	0.222	0.581)	0.221	0.199)	0.581)	0.502	0.209)	0.202	0.518)	0.209)	0.204
Conaboration	(0.507)	(0.328)	(0.615)	(0.507)	(0.328)	(0.616)	(0.507)	(0.330)	(0.673)	(0.507)	(0.330)	(0.673)
Firm Age	0.0415	0.0425*	0.116**	(0.507)	(0.520)	(0.010)	0.158	0.0863	0.0814	(0.507)	(0.550)	(0.075)
типле	(0.0360)	(0.0239)	(0.0460)				(0.105)	(0.0596)	(0.102)			
IMR	(0.0500)	(0.0257)	(0.0400)	-2 156	-5 444*	3 168**	(0.105)	(0.0570)	(0.102)	-8 223	-11.08	2 163
				(1.872)	(3.061)	(1.277)				(5.397)	(7.573)	(2.946)
Founding Year Fixed Effect	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Inalpha	2.364***	1.437***	2.864***	2.364***	1.437***	2.864***	2.308***	1.398***	2.858***	2.308***	1.398***	2.858***
•	(0.0859)	(0.0818)	(0.0478)	(0.0859)	(0.0818)	(0.0478)	(0.0867)	(0.0825)	(0.0478)	(0.0867)	(0.0825)	(0.0478)
Constant	-3.384***	-2.070***	12.02***	-0.227	3.999	10.67***	-5.401**	-2.701*	12.72***	6.644	9.656	11.81***
	(0.836)	(0.521)	(0.952)	(2.474)	(3.204)	(1.262)	(2.416)	(1.460)	(2.546)	(6.055)	(7.274)	(3.762)
Observations	847	847	847	847	847	847	847	847	847	847	847	847
LR chi2	43.63***	33.58***	37.04***	43.63***	33.59***	36.96***	59.84***	48.62***	42.36***	59.92***	48.66***	42.27***
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.0014	0.0019	0.02	0.0138	0.0019	0.0275	0.0199	0.0022	0.0275	0.02	0.0022

Note: Inverse Mill's Ratio was created using the residuals from the first stage selection model, where we estimated the likelihood of receiving patent, trademark and financing by means of a probit regression using firm' age. Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

•	All three types of spinouts (i.e., spinouts from the supplier, focal, and user industries) create more knowledge and attract more funding than non-spawn startups
•	Focal spinouts have a higher number of registered

Focal spinouts have a higher number of registered trademarks compared to supplier spinouts and non-spawn startups.



### **5- HOW DO THEY DIFFER WITH RESPECT TO SUCCESS?**

#### STAGE ONE - Competing Hazard Regressions of Entrants' Failure (Dissolution) or Success (Cash-Out)

	(	1)	(2)			
VARIABLES	Failure	Success	Failure	Success		
Startups	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.		
Academic Spinoffs	-0.253	0.555	-0.229	0.627		
1	(0.542)	(0.382)	(0.545)	(0.383)		
Spin-outs	-0.447	0.740**	-0.418	0.746**		
	(0.397)	(0.321)	(0.401)	(0.323)		
Parent Spinoff	-1.032	0.436	-0.992	0.418		
	(0.690)	(0.414)	(0.700)	(0.418)		
Test of coefficient equality: Academic Spinoff = Spin-out	0.17	0.53	0.16	0.21		
Test of coefficient equality: Parent Spinoff = Spin-out	0.87	1.08	0.83	1.23		
N Founders	0.0529	0.130	0.131	0.0955		
N. Founders	(0.185)	(0.0809)	(0.192)	(0.0933)		
N. Founders Same Parent	0.129	0.121	0.168	0.0948		
	(0.293)	(0.128)	(0.292)	(0.129)		
Founder Tenure	0.0101	-0.0417**	0.00800	-0.0426**		
	(0.0323)	(0.0195)	(0.0325)	(0.0197)		
Founder Position Parent (Executive=1; Other=0)	-0.362	0.0212	-0.339	0.0598		
	(0.352)	(0.197)	(0.361)	(0.199)		
Serial Entrepreneur	0.304	0.196	0.316	0.219		
Founder Position Firm (Executive=1: Other=0)	(0.317)	(0.169)	(0.324)	(0.174)		
Founder Fosition Firm (Executive 1, Outer 0)	(0.445)	(0.261)	(0.452)	(0.265)		
Founder Gender (Female=1: Male=0)	0.413	0.278	0.477	0.307		
	(0.604)	(0.319)	(0.611)	(0.322)		
Founder Education (PhD=1; Other=0)	0.181	0.519***	0.132	0.589***		
	(0.363)	(0.179)	(0.364)	(0.181)		
Collaboration	-1.045	-0.139	-1.021	-0.206		
	(0.660)	(0.252)	(0.662)	(0.258)		
N. Irademark	0.0406***	-0.0246	0.04/0***	-0.0147		
N Patent	-0.168*	0.000912	-0.162*	0.00193)		
14. I defit	(0.0881)	(0.00000000000000000000000000000000000	(0.0907)	(0.000608)		
Total Funding (log)	0.0125	0.0575***	0.00725	0.0570***		
	(0.0206)	(0.0119)	(0.0209)	(0.0121)		
Time (log)	0.339	0.468***	0.584**	0.697***		
	(0.209)	(0.116)	(0.257)	(0.143)		
Constant	-5.730***	-6.769***	-7.016***	-8.161***		
	(0.930)	(0.568)	(1.437)	(0.847)		
Entry Year Fixed Effect	N	10	Y	ES		
Ubservations (N. Firms)	10,	/05	10,703			
Log likelinood	-1120	J.728/ )5***	-1103	.9/21 2 ***		
	108.9	<b>1</b> 5 <sup>+</sup>	142.8	0		

• Employee spinouts have a higher likelihood of cash-out through acquisition or IPO than non-spawn startups.

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



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#### **5- HOW DO THEY DIFFER WITH RESPECT TO SUCCESS?**

#### STAGE TWO – Competing Hazard Regressions of Spin-outs' Failure (Dissolution) or Success (Cash-Out)

	(	1)	(2)			
VARIABLES	Failure	Success	Failure	Success		
Startups	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.		
Supplier Spin-outs	-0.989*	0.832**	-0.930	0.833**		
Focal Spin-outs	(0.569) -0.287	(0.350) 0.988**	(0.580)	(0.355)		
i ocar spin-outs	(0.608)	(0.388)	(0.611)	(0.392)		
User Spin-outs	-0.279	0.682**	-0.227	0.679*		
	(0.454)	(0.345)	(0.463)	(0.350)		
Test of coefficient equality: Supplier Spin-out = Focal Spin-out	1.07	0.29	0.91	0.15		
Test of coefficient equality: User Spin-out = Focal Spin-out	0.00	1.12	0.01	0.85		
N. Founders	0.0598	0.0550	-0.00734	0.0308		
	(0.202)	(0.0977)	(0.209)	(0.100)		
N. Founders Same Parent	-0.350	0.119	-0.341	0.0694		
	(0.458)	(0.162)	(0.463)	(0.166)		
Founder Tenure	-0.0191	-0.0/98***	-0.0156	-0.0801***		
Founder Position Parent (Executive=1: Other=0)	(0.0471)	(0.0300)	(0.0474)	(0.0303)		
Founder Fosition Fatent (Executive 1, Other 0)	(0.422)	(0.241)	(0.433)	(0.245)		
Serial Entrepreneur	0.207	0.341*	0.206	0.347*		
	(0.394)	(0.205)	(0.401)	(0.208)		
Founder Position Firm (Executive=1; Other=0)	0.00357	0.373	-0.0611	0.319		
	(0.549)	(0.377)	(0.557)	(0.382)		
Founder Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	0.315	-0.00862	0.389	-0.123		
	(0.743)	(0.381)	(0.765)	(0.389)		
Founder Education (PhD=1; Other=0)	0.0399	0.436*	-0.0556	0.556**		
Callaboration	(0.499)	(0.225)	(0.511)	(0.234)		
Collaboration	-13.44	0.0552	-15.51	-0.0195		
N Trademark	-0.0913	0.00415	-0.101	0.00845		
	(0.119)	(0.0241)	(0.125)	(0.0232)		
N. Patent	-0.150	-0.0104	-0.137	-0.00870		
	(0.132)	(0.0119)	(0.134)	(0.0111)		
Total Funding (log)	0.0124	0.0659***	0.00927	0.0676***		
	(0.0260)	(0.0150)	(0.0267)	(0.0153)		
Time (log)	0.203	0.667***	0.469	0.939***		
	(0.254)	(0.150)	(0.309)	(0.190)		
Constant	-5.028***	-7.082***	-21.09	-8.251***		
Entry Voor Eived Effect	(1.150)	(0.691)	(2,293)	(1.051)		
Observations	6	948	1 ES 6.948			
Log likelihood	-726	02952	-707.90316			
Chi-square	91.1	4***	127	.39***		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						

• All three types of spinouts are more likely to cash-out.

• supplier spinouts are less likely to fail compared to non-spawn startups.

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



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### CONCLUSION

We examine all the various types of start-ups in a consistent way

Consistent with the evolutionary and the resource-based theories of the firm, we show that heterogeneity in pre-entry knowledge and resources leads to heterogeneity in new ventures' capabilities and long-run performance.

We confirm that founders' pre-entry experiences in the vertically related upstream supplier or downstream user industries also matter significantly (Adams et al., 2019).

Type of Entrants	Entry Time	Trajectory	Resources & Capabilities	Performance
Academic Spinoffs	28% Early- Stages	Symbolic systems	—	—
Parent Spinoffs	27% Early- Stages	Robotics	Technological capabilities, Market capabilities & Financial resources	_
Supplier Spinouts	31% Early- Stages	Symbolic systems	Technological capabilities & Financial resources	More likely to Cash-out & less likely to Fail
Focal Spinouts	24% Early- Stages	Robotics	Technological capabilities, Market capabilities & Financial resources	More likely to Cash-out
User Spinouts	29% Early- Stages	Learning systems	Technological capabilities & Financial resources	More likely to Cash-out



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## **Thank You for Your Attention**

Aliasghar Bahoo-Torodi (aliasghar.bahoo@unibocconi.it) Roberto Fontana (roberto.fontana@unibocconi.it) Franco Malerba(franco.malerba@unibocconi.it)



### **DESCRIPTIVES**

Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix																		
Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
1- Failure	0.04	0.19	0	1	1.00													
2- Success	0.13	0.34	0	1	-0.08	1.00												
3- N. Patents	15.63	465.68	0	16787	-0.01	0.07	1.00											
4- N. Trademarks	2.04	15.44	0	521	0.02	0.08	0.94	1.00										
5- Total Funding (mill)	20.50	73.95	0	1241	-0.03	0.02	0.01	0.10	1.00									
6- N. Founders	1.99	1.05	1	9	-0.02	0.10	0.03	0.05	0.19	1.00								
7- N. Founders Same Parent	1.29	0.61	1	5	-0.01	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.17	0.48	1.00							
8- Founder Tenure	5.54	4.91	0.25	39	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.02	-0.02	-0.08	0.00	1.00						
9- Founder Position Parent (Executive=1; Other=0)	0.60	0.49	0	1	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.06	-0.02	0.19	1.00					
10- Serial Entrepreneur	0.43	0.50	0	1	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	0.10	0.33	1.00				
11- Founder Position New Firm (Executive=1; Other=0)	0.89	0.31	0	1	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.10	-0.02	0.00	0.05	0.01	1.00			
12- Founder Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	0.91	0.28	0	1	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.02	1.00		
13- Founder Education (PhD=1; Other=0)	0.27	0.44	0	1	-0.01	0.09	-0.01	-0.01	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.08	-0.21	-0.10	-0.01	-0.10	1.00	
14- Collaboration between Industry & Academia	0.14	0.35	0	1	-0.05	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.08	0.24	0.03	0.03	-0.23	-0.09	-0.02	-0.06	0.31	1.00

Observation=1300. Bolded pairwise correlations are significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed tests of significance).



### **FURTHER ANALYSIS I**

Entrants' Capabilities and M	Spinouts' Capabilities and Moderating effect of the Application Field (ref. Non-Spawn Startup (1) (2)												
		(1)			(2)		VADIADIES	Detent	(1) Tendamark	English	Detent	(2) Tread arm and	E
VARIABLES	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	VARIABLES	Fatent	Hademark	Funding	Fatent	Trademark	
Stortups	raf	naf	raf	raf	raf	raf	Startups	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	
Startups	rej.	rej.	rej.	rej.	rej.	rej.	Supplier Spinouts	0.554	-0.0907	1.084	0.859	-0.00105	1
Academic Spinoffs	-0.157	-0.373	0.0538	-0.103	-0.327	-0.0265		(0.823)	(0.556)	(1.124)	(0.833)	(0.539)	(1
	(0.567)	(0.361)	(0.651)	(0.565)	(0.363)	(0.642)	Focal Spinouts	1.286	0.342	2.092	1.661*	0.481	2
Spin-outs	1.742***	0.292	0.723	1.767***	0.310	0.717	User Spinouts	-0.241	-0.409	0.733	-0.195	-0.348	(
-	(0.455)	(0.281)	(0.496)	(0.459)	(0.284)	(0.495)		(0.892)	(0.602)	(1.155)	(0.908)	(0.602)	(1
Parent Spinoff 0.403 -0.202 0		0.446	0.455	-0.197	0.463								
	(0.631)	(0.389)	(0.675)	(0.614)	(0.391)	(0.676)	Robotics	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	
Entry Time (Early Entrents-1: Lete Entrents-0)	0.720	0.321	0.102	0.461	0.166	0.375	Learning Systems	-1.260*	-0.356	-0.342	-1.175*	-0.255	-1
Entry Time (Early Entrants=1; Late Entrants=0)	(1.710)	(0.022)	-0.102	-0.401	-0.100	-0.575		(0.685)	(0.441)	(0.824)	(0.675)	(0.437)	(0
	(1.710)	(0.923)	(1.420)	(0.017)	(0.393)	(0.089)	Symbolic Systems	(1.124)	-0.594 (0.706)	(1.338)	-1.148 (1.113)	(0.701)	-(1
Academic Spinoffs × Early Entrants	0.909	0.472	0.931	1.277*	0.427	0.822							
	(0.776)	(0.474)	(0.840)	(0.744)	(0.470)	(0.830)	Supplier Spinouts × Learning Systems	0.380	-0.155	-0.312	(0.0536	-0.218	-
Spin-outs × Early Entrants	-1.590**	-0.410	0.598	-1.387**	-0.469	0.504	Supplier Spinouts × Symbolic Systems	0.420	-0.809	0.342	0.454	-1.215	-1
	(0.676)	(0.411)	(0.737)	(0.657)	(0.411)	(0.722)	- III - II - I - I - I - I - I - I - I	(1.517)	(0.987)	(1.869)	(1.461)	(0.954)	(1
Parent Spinoff × Early Entrants	0.891	1.407**	1.069	1.376	1.449***	0.934	Focal Spinouts × Learning Systems	0.122	0.304	-1.090	-0.364	0.0918	-
	(0.917)	(0.560)	(0.981)	(0.870)	(0.552)	(0.966)		(1.157)	(0.712)	(1.425)	(1.155)	(0.713)	(1
							Focal Spinouts × Symbolic Systems	-1.485	-0.8/9	-1.054	-2.048	-0.952	-
N. Founders	0.293**	0.224***	0.407***	0.308**	0.253***	0.403***	User Spinouts × Learning Systems	2.291**	0.781	0.425	2.106**	0.637	(
	(0.139)	(0.0788)	(0.143)	(0.125)	(0.0780)	(0.138)		(1.024)	(0.667)	(1.260)	(1.034)	(0.661)	(1
N. Founders Same Parent	1.544***	0.641***	0.513**	1.580***	0.614***	0.498**	User Spinouts × Symbolic Systems	1.318	0.524	0.0488	1.340	0.292	-1
	(0.218)	(0.123)	(0.241)	(0.209)	(0.121)	(0.236)		(1.530)	(0.975)	(1.847)	(1.540)	(0.977)	(1
Founder Tenure	0.0279	0.0176	-0.0152	0.0270	0.0177	-0.0162	N. E	0.2048*	0.19688	0.45288	0.2528	0.21088	0
	(0.0248)	(0.0145)	(0.0258)	(0.0234)	(0.0142)	(0.0256)	IN. Founders	(0.138)	(0.0854)	(0.185)	(0.129)	(0.0831)	()
Founder Position Parent (Executive=1; Other=0)	0.0686	0.237	0.0323	0.136	0.269	-0.00914	N. Founders Same Parent	0.0651	0.162	0.435	0.0688	0.153	Ò
	(0.276)	(0.168)	(0.301)	(0.253)	(0.164)	(0.286)		(0.273)	(0.166)	(0.348)	(0.244)	(0.159)	((
Serial Entrepreneur	0.554**	0.109	0.0498	0.458*	0.0960	0.0664	Founder Tenure	0.0392	0.0515***	0.00215	0.0273	0.0518***	-0
	(0.261)	(0.152)	(0.268)	(0.247)	(0.149)	(0.260)	Foundar Position Parant (Exacutiva=1: Other=0)	(0.0347)	(0.0198)	(0.0393)	(0.0.540)	(0.0195)	(0
Founder Position Firm (Executive=1; Other=0)	1.418***	0.691***	0.655*	1.378***	0.711***	0.571	Founder Founder Falent (Executive=1, Oute1=0)	(0.327)	(0.199)	(0.381)	(0.317)	(0.195)	()
	(0.376)	(0.218)	(0.397)	(0.356)	(0.218)	(0.384)	Serial Entrepreneur	0.0234	-0.0702	-0.136	-0.00861	-0.0483	-0
Founder Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	0.840**	0.573***	0.671	(0.207)	0.592**	0.677		(0.287)	(0.173)	(0.340)	(0.278)	(0.171)	((
	(0.403)	(0.250)	(0.427)	(0.387)	(0.248)	(0.415)	Founder Position Firm (Executive=1; Other=0)	1.678***	0.820***	1.073*	1.735***	0.797***	1
Founder Education (PnD=1; Other=0)	0.543***	0.00880	0.480*	0.569**	0.0455	0.549**	Foundar Gandar (Famala=1: Mala=0)	(0.514)	(0.288)	(0.570)	(0.482)	(0.285)	()
Callabaratian	(0.208)	(0.104)	(0.289)	(0.230)	(0.139)	(0.280)	Founder Gender (Fennae=1, Male=5)	(0.514)	(0.325)	(0.597)	(0.488)	(0.312)	(
Collaboration	(0.424)	(0.245)	(0.412)	-0.0937	0.313	(0.276)	Founder Education (PhD=1; Other=0)	1.090***	0.259	0.398	1.259***	0.259	Ì
Einer Ann	(0.454)	(0.243)	(0.415)	(0.399)	(0.240)	(0.570)		(0.322)	(0.209)	(0.409)	(0.309)	(0.199)	((
Film Age	0.0955	(0.0236)	(0.0702)				Collaboration	-0.265	-0.410	0.188	-0.122	-0.399	
IMD	(0.104)	(0.0525)	(0.0702)	9 595***	8 027**	2 160***	Firm Age	0.148	0.0604	(0.008)	(0.510)	(0.328)	((
IWIK				(2.268)	(2.461)	(1 202)	i miningo	(0.105)	(0.0604)	(0.108)			
Founding Vear Fixed Effect	VES	VES	VES	(2.208) NO	(3.401) NO	(1.205) NO	IMR				-3.306*	-6.284**	2.
Insluba	2 466***	1 / 88***	2 787***	2 480***	1 511***	2 702***					(1.963)	(3.109)	(1
maipha	(0.0662)	(0.0625)	(0.0380)	(0.0650)	(0.0620)	(0.0380)	Founding Year Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	
Constant	5 835***	2 503***	12 07***	6 21 1**	6.054*	10.88***	maipna	(0.0872)	(0.0829)	2.858*** (0.0479)	2.520****	(0.0822)	2.8
Constant	(1.063)	(0.590)	(0.868)	(3.036)	(3.660)	(1.075)	Constant	-4.270*	-1.849	13.36***	1.668	4.991	10
	(1000)	(0250)	(0.000)	(5,050)	(5,000)	(10/2)		(2.460)	(1.543)	(2.752)	(2.679)	(3.301)	(1
Observations	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,300	Observations	849	849	849	849	849	
Log likelihood	-1743.70	-1931.62	-15097.31	-1746.74	-1938.02	-15100.32	Log likelihood	-1052.96	-1190.6	-9548.81	-1059.38	-1197.5	-9
LR chi2	294.61***	145.45***	68.72***	288.54***	132.65***	62.71***	LR chi2	71.34***	58.10***	45.84	58.49***	44.22***	41
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0	0.05. * p<0.1						Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<	J.US, * p<0.1					

While employee spinouts have a better technological capability than non-spawn startups, those that entered the industry during the early stages have a lower number of granted patents than other spinouts. Instead, parent spinoffs that entered the industry during the early stages of growth have a higher number registered of trademarks.

(2) Trademark Funding

ref.

1.400

(1.086)

2.138\*

(1.235)

0.721

(1.141)

ref.

-0.281

(0.813)

-0.642

(1.309)

-0.570

(1.205) -0.171

(1.762)

-1.237

(1.382)

-1.310

(2.091)

0.419

(1.225)

-0.217

(1.802)

0.443\*\*

(0.177)

0.453

(0.324)

-0.00179 (0.0385)

0.152

(0.379)

-0.0680

(0.322)

1.091\*

0.578

(0.583)

0.407

(0.393)

0.348

(0.643)

2.997\*\*

(1.291)

NO

2.863\*\*\*

(0.0478)10.53\*\*\*

(1.406)

849

-9550.78

41.72\*\*\*

4

> User spinouts active in the learning systems field create more knowledge compared to non-spawn startups.

Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



### **FURTHER ANALYSIS II**

Negative Binomial Regressions for Spinouts' Capabilities (ref. Academic Spinoffs)												
		(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)	
VARIABLES	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding
Academic Spinoffs	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
Supplier Spinouts	0.469	-0.273	0.488	0.471	-0.273	0.490	0.239	-0.396	0.286	0.240	-0.397	0.288
Focal Spinouts	(0.394) 0.793	(0.255) 0.449	0.836	(0.394) 0.795	(0.255) 0.449	0.835	(0.419) 0.743	0.261)	(0.487) 0.742	(0.419) 0.741	0.261)	(0.488) 0.747
User Spinouts	(0.497) 0.874**	(0.302) 0.183	(0.533) 0.649	(0.497) 0.876**	(0.302) 0.184	(0.533) 0.644	(0.504) 0.941**	(0.305) 0.167	(0.570) 0.596	(0.504) 0.940**	(0.305) 0.167	(0.570) 0.596
	(0.446)	(0.272)	(0.444)	(0.446)	(0.272)	(0.444)	(0.453)	(0.276)	(0.474)	(0.453)	(0.276)	(0.474)
N. Founders	0.339***	0.217***	0.407**	0.340***	0.218***	0.405**	0.441***	0.230***	0.428**	0.442***	0.230***	0.428**
N. Founders Same Parent	0.0470	0.148	0.500*	0.0472	0.148	0.502*	0.0629	0.159	(0.177) 0.471*	0.0633	0.159	(0.177) 0.470*
Founder Tenure	(0.225) 0.0608**	(0.137) 0.0439**	(0.267) -0.000707	(0.225) 0.0608**	(0.137) 0.0439**	(0.267) -0.000441	(0.240) 0.0794**	(0.141) 0.0461**	(0.274) 0.00169	(0.240) 0.0793**	(0.141) 0.0461**	(0.275) 0.00192
Founder Position Parent (Executive=1; Other=0)	(0.0300) -0.392	(0.0189) 0.146	(0.0330) -0.0871	(0.0301) -0.392	(0.0189) 0.146	(0.0330) -0.0846	(0.0314) -0.271	(0.0196) 0.191	(0.0333) -0.0698	(0.0314) -0.270	(0.0196) 0.192	(0.0333) -0.0723
Serial Entrepreneur	(0.286) 0.308	(0.186) -0.0782	(0.345) 0.0144	(0.286) 0.308	(0.186) -0.0780	(0.345) 0.0138	(0.300) 0.382	(0.189) -0.0235	(0.369) -0.0459	(0.299) 0.382	(0.189) -0.0232	(0.369) -0.0485
Founder Position Firm (Executive=1; Other=0)	(0.258) 0.716*	(0.163) 0.705***	(0.307) 0.803*	(0.258) 0.717*	(0.163) 0.705***	(0.308) 0.806*	(0.258) 1.053**	(0.166) 0.715***	(0.322) 0.769*	(0.258) 1.050**	(0.166) 0.715***	(0.323) 0.767*
Founder Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	(0.381) 0.365	(0.242) 0.580**	(0.454) 0.605	(0.381) 0.366	(0.242) 0.580**	(0.455) 0.602	(0.417) 0.251	(0.245) 0.535*	(0.457) 0.705	(0.417) 0.251	(0.245) 0.535*	(0.457) 0.701
Founder Education (PhD=1: Other=0)	(0.413) 0.936***	(0.274) 0.0920	(0.489) 0.452	(0.413) 0.934***	(0.274) 0.0917	(0.489) 0.454	(0.428) 0.846***	(0.278) 0.0768	(0.504) 0.457	(0.428) 0.846***	(0.278) 0.0767	(0.504) 0.460
Collaboration	(0.265)	(0.171)	(0.328)	(0.265)	(0.171)	(0.329)	(0.279)	(0.177)	(0.335)	(0.279)	(0.177)	(0.335)
	(0.373)	(0.245)	(0.407)	(0.373)	(0.245)	(0.407)	(0.399)	(0.249)	(0.442)	(0.399)	(0.249)	(0.442)
rimi Age	(0.0388)	(0.0232)	(0.0454)				(0.0962)	(0.0550)	(0.0898)			
IMR				-6.463*** (2.008)	-8.220*** (3.023)	3.743*** -1269				-10.64** (4.902)	-13.73* (7.113)	3.660 (2.605)
Founding Year Fixed Effect	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
inaipna	(0.0776)	(0.0767)	(0.0447)	(0.0776)	(0.0767)	(0.0447)	(0.0783)	(0.0771)	(0.0447)	(0.0783)	(0.0771)	(0.0447)
Constant	-2.948*** (0.851)	-2.391*** (0.493)	12.09*** (0.910)	6.511*** (2.525)	6.763** (3.166)	10.53*** (1.244)	-4.340** (1.978)	-3.021** (1.229)	11.68*** (2.134)	11.23** (5.621)	12.26* (6.940)	10.14*** (3.211)
Observations	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943	943
LR chi2	41.16***	43.96***	38.59***	41.24***	44.03***	38.15***	66.46***	56.86***	42.88***	66.45***	56.97***	42.62***
Pseudo K2	0.0156	0.0158	0.0017	0.0156	0.0158	0.001/	0.0244	0.0205	0.0019	0.0244	0.0205	0.0019

Standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



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# • Spinouts originating from the downstream (i.e., user) industries have a higher number of granted patents compared to academic spinoffs.

### **FURTHER ANALYSIS III**

Spinouts' Capabilities and Moderating effect of the Application Field (ref. Academic Spinoff)							Spinouts' Capabilities and Moderating effect of the Entry Time (ref. Academic Spinoff, Threshold: 2012)							
• •		(1)			(2)		Spinous Capabilities and Moderatin	s enteet of the	(1)	(rej. neuach	ue spinojj, i	(2)	12)	
VARIABLES	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	VARIABLES	Patent	Trademark	Funding	Patent	Trademark	Funding	
Academic Spinoffs	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	A cademic Spinoffs	ref	raf	ref	rof	rof	ref	
Supplier Spinouts	1.800**	-0.0917	1.042	1.830**	0.00122	1.164	readenic opnors	ng.	rej.	nej.	ng.	ng.	ng.	
Focal Spinouts	(0.815) 2.131**	(0.523) 0.354	(1.073)	(0.813) 2.036**	(0.503) 0.426	(0.958) 1.927*	Supplier Spinouts	1.142**	-0.289	0.162	1.386***	-0.157	0.318	
of	(0.957)	(0.593)	(1.167)	(0.981)	(0.594)	(1.137)		(0.482)	(0.343)	(0.607)	(0.465)	(0.339)	(0.593)	
User Spinouts	0.976	-0.496	0.402	0.800	-0.406	0.459	Focal Spinouts	1.674***	0.667*	1.244*	1.783***	0.782**	1.420**	
	(0.889)	(0.588)	(1.094)	(0.898)	(0.578)	(1.068)		(0.579)	(0.393)	(0.716)	(0.582)	(0.395)	(0.707)	
Robotics	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	ref	User Spinouts	1.376***	0.599*	0.874	1.358***	0.602*	0.923	
Robolics	rej.	rej.	rej.	rej.	ng.	rej.		(0.507)	(0.547)	(0.004)	(0.505)	(0.547)	(0.595)	
Learning Systems	0.747	-0.262	0.118	0.490	-0.336	0.127	Entry Time (Early Entrants=1: Late Entrants=0)	1.200	0.0692	0.0347	0.742	0.185	0.452	
Symbolic Systems	(0.587)	(0.380)	(0.722)	(0.591)	(0.365)	(0.702)		(1.472)	(0.913)	(1.661)	(0.488)	(0.305)	(0.573)	
Symbolic Systems	(0.763)	(0.490)	(0.935)	(0.748)	(0.475)	(0.909)		()	()	()	()	()	()	
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1	1.02788	0.220	0.022	1 73744	0.17(	0.045	A Supplier Spinouts × Early Entrants	-2.030***	-0.152	0.310	-2.267***	-0.142	0.326	
Supplier Spinouts × Learning Systems	-1.95/**	-0.220	-0.923	-1./5/**	-0.176	-0.945		(0.643)	(0.408)	(0.793)	(0.618)	(0.401)	(0.771)	
Supplier Spinouts x Symbolic Systems	-1.608	-1.685**	-0.973	-1.469	-1.938**	-1.254	Focal Spinouts × Early Entrants	-2.178***	-0.540	-1.270	-2.705***	-0.630	-1.244	
	(1.225)	(0.814)	(1.600)	(1.158)	(0.788)	(1.473)		(0.803)	(0.506)	(0.982)	(0.793)	(0.504)	(0.964)	
Focal Spinouts × Learning Systems	-1.605	0.176	-1.512	-1.504	0.189	-1.640	User Spinouts × Early Entrants	-1.209**	-0.769**	-0.506	-1.357**	-0.725*	-0.397	
	(1.051)	(0.660)	(1.308)	(1.124)	(0.663)	(1.300)		(0.595)	(0.384)	(0.732)	(0.589)	(0.373)	(0.715)	
Focal Spinouts × Symbolic Systems	-2.705*	-1.337	-2.369	-3.122**	-1.680*	-2.403								
IL OL AND COL	(1.558)	(1.014)	(1.846)	(1.542)	(0.986)	(1.800)	N. Founders	0.451***	0.228***	0.438**	0.368***	0.226***	0.429**	
User Spinouts × Learning Systems	-0.0314 (0.906)	(0.608)	(1.141)	(0.916)	(0.599)	(1.108)		(0.134)	(0.0842)	(0.181)	(0.128)	(0.0825)	(0.171)	
User Spinouts × Symbolic Systems	-0.710	-0.207	-1.096	-0.275	-0.339	-1.235	N. Founders Same Parent	0.0930	0.185	0.507*	0.206	0.200	0.516*	
	(1.265)	(0.832)	(1.628)	(1.234)	(0.806)	(1.500)		(0.235)	(0.141)	(0.285)	(0.229)	(0.140)	(0.281)	
							Founder Tenure	0.0733**	0.0454**	0.00326	0.0581**	0.0415**	0.00589	
N. Founders	0.428***	0.252***	0.490***	0.326**	0.252***	0.468***		(0.0300)	(0.0192)	(0.0344)	(0.0280)	(0.0186)	(0.0345)	
N. E-unders Serve Decent	(0.136)	(0.0850)	(0.186)	(0.133)	(0.0834)	(0.177)	Founder Position Parent (Executive=1; Other=0)	-0.143	0.194	-0.0663	-0.156	0.170	-0.142	
N. Founders Same Farent	(0.238)	(0.138	(0.278)	(0.224)	(0.137)	(0.270)		(0.294)	(0.190)	(0.376)	(0.283)	(0.187)	(0.366)	
Founder Tenure	0.0765**	0.0483**	0.00309	0.0574**	0.0469**	-0.000165	Serial Entrepreneur	0.362	-0.0816	-0.158	0.359	-0.120	-0.116	
	(0.0303)	(0.0193)	(0.0336)	(0.0293)	(0.0187)	(0.0332)		(0.258)	(0.168)	(0.328)	(0.245)	(0.166)	(0.317)	
Founder Position Parent (Executive=1; Other=0)	-0.231	0.200	0.129	-0.346	0.179	0.168	Founder Position Firm (Executive=1; Other=0)	1.263***	0.710***	0.792*	1.139***	0.724***	0.816*	
0.110	(0.321)	(0.196)	(0.385)	(0.316)	(0.193)	(0.372)		(0.410)	(0.246)	(0.459)	(0.381)	(0.243)	(0.460)	
Serial Entrepreneur	0.381	-0.0290	-0.126	0.300	-0.0684	-0.0790	Founder Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	0.494	0.512*	0.686	0.545	0.559**	0.610	
Founder Position Firm (Executive=1: Other=0)	1 320***	0.710***	0.953*	1 024**	0.701***	0.997**		(0.427)	(0.280)	(0.516)	(0.422)	(0.275)	(0.497)	
Founder Fostion Finn (Executive=1, Outer=0)	(0.445)	(0.250)	(0.493)	(0.414)	(0.248)	(0.487)	Founder Education (PhD=1; Other=0)	0.632**	0.0710	0.453	0.682***	0.0839	0.495	
Founder Gender (Female=1; Male=0)	0.136	0.573**	0.710	0.333	0.619**	0.641		(0.274)	(0.177)	(0.332)	(0.258)	(0.171)	(0.327)	
	(0.444)	(0.279)	(0.511)	(0.434)	(0.273)	(0.495)	Collaboration	-0.111	0.146	0.316	-0.0694	0.203	0.430	
Founder Education (PhD=1; Other=0)	0.850***	0.0409	0.436	0.969***	0.0553	0.446		(0.388)	(0.252)	(0.447)	(0.372)	(0.248)	(0.419)	
Callebration	(0.284)	(0.1/6)	(0.339)	(0.273)	(0.170)	(0.335)	Firm Age	0.179*	0.102*	0.131				
Conaboration	(0.393)	(0.253)	(0.443)	(0.371)	(0.250)	(0.430)	U U	(0.0934)	(0.0544)	(0.0903)				
Firm Age	0.187**	0.0931*	0.113	()	()	()	IMR				-8.908***	-10.19***	3.077**	
	(0.0954)	(0.0555)	(0.0940)								(2.278)	(3.878)	(1.537)	
IMR				-7.531***	-8.995***	3.589***	Founding Year Fixed Effect	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	
	VEC	VEC	VEC	(2.014)	(2.993)	(1.301)	Inalpha	2.239***	1.343***	2.798***	2.274***	1.369***	2.802***	
rounding Year Fixed Effect	1 ES 2 245***	1 220***	2 707***	2 206***	1 250***	2 801***	•	(0.0789)	(0.0773)	(0.0447)	(0.0785)	(0.0769)	(0.0447)	
maipua	(0.0786)	(0.0776)	(0.0447)	(0.0780)	(0.0772)	(0.0447)	Constant	-4.972***	-2.979***	11.71***	8.525***	8.614**	10.68***	
Constant	-4.694**	-2.608**	11.85***	7.265***	7.685**	10.21***		(0.922)	(0.596)	(1.057)	(3.066)	(4.110)	(1.359)	
	(2.020)	(1.272)	(2.240)	(2.562)	(3.137)	(1.337)		. ,			. ,			
Observations	943	943	943	943	943	943	Observations	943	943	943	943	943	943	
Log likelihood	-1284.69	-1355.49	-11017.89	-1296.01	-1360.34	-11019.79	Log likelihood	-1284.2	-1358.7	-11018.5	-1290.6	-1364.5	-11020.6	
LR chi2	75.09***	67.89***	46.95*	52.44***	58.21***	43.15***	LR chi2	76.09***	61.51***	45.76**	63.33***	49.78***	41.52***	
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** pd	0.05 * p<0.1	1					Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01. ** p<0.0	15. * p<0.1						

l errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01. \*\* p<0.05. \* p<0.1



Bocconi

5

The Invernizzi Center for Research on Innovation, Organization and Strategy All three types of spinouts that entered the industry during the early stages have a lower number of patents and trademarks compared to the late entrants, such that no significant there is difference their 1**n** capabilities and those of the academic spinoffs.

Controlling for the fields of application, supplier and focal spinouts create more knowledge compared to the academic spinoffs. However, supplier spinouts operating Iearning systems in<sup>-</sup> the sector and focal spinouts active the in symbolic systems have a lower number of granted patents, such that there **1**S no difference between their technological capability and that of academic spinoffs. Supplier spinouts active in

the symbolic systems sector have a lower number 0Ť trademarks compared to other entrants.